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Zhang v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. Adv. Rep. 104 (2004)1
CONTRACTS- SALE OF PROPERTY: THE PREEXISTING DUTY
RULE
Summary
On February 1, 2004, Lanlin Zhang contracted to buy former realtor Frank
Sorichetti’s Las Vegas home for $532,500. On February 3, 2004 Sorichetti told Zhang
that he was terminating the sale “to stay in the home a little longer.” Sorichetti then stated
that he would sell Zhang the home if she paid more money. Zhang agreed and another
contract was drafted that same day reciting a sales price of $578,000.
On February 16, 2004, Sorichetti notified Zhang that a murder had occurred in the
home several years earlier, and that Zhang could cancel the sales contract if she desired.
Subsequently, Sorichetti rescinded the second sales contract “to use and/or dispose of my
home as I wish,” Zhang sued seeking damages, declaratory relief and specific
performance of the original contract. Zhang also recorded a lis pendens against the
property to prevent Sorichetti from disposing of it before the conclusion of the case.
Sorichetti countered Zhang’s complaint with a NRPC 12(b)(5) motion for
dismissal for failure to state a claim reasoning that the parties had replaced the original
contract with the February 3 contract by novation.2 The district court ruled in favor of
Sorichetti and dismissed Zhang’s complaint despite Zhang’s unsuccessful attempt to
amend her complaint to seek performance on the February 3 sales contract. The court
also expunged her lis pendens on the property but stayed the order temporarily to allow
Zhang to seek relief
Zhang subsequently filed a writ of mandamus compelling the district court to
reinstate her complaint, vacate the expungement order, and grant leave to amend the
complaint. The court then held that Zhang was entitled to her writ of mandamus since the
district court manifestly abused its discretion in dismissing her complaint, and reinstated
the complaint as to the original sales contract under the contractual doctrine, the
preexisting duty rule.
Issue and Disposition
Issue
Is a purchase agreement for real property enforceable when the buyer executes it
only because the seller would not perform under an earlier purchase agreement for a
lesser price?
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66 C.J.S. Novation § 2 at 484 (1998) (defining “novation” as “a substitution of a new contract or
obligation for an old one which is thereby extinguished”).
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Disposition
No, a modified purchase agreement made specifically because the seller wanted
an increased price is a contract not supported by consideration and is invalid.
Subsequently, Appellant had a cause of action for breach of the initial contract, the court
reversed the dismissal of her complaint and reinstated her lis pendens on the property and
remanded the case for further proceedings.
Commentary
State of the Law Before Zhang
The principle commonly known as the preexisting duty rule, a doctrine that
protects buyers from exploitation by sellers, is best explained in Williston on Contracts:
Where two parties have entered into a bilateral agreement, it will often
occur that one of the parties, having become dissatisfied with the
contract, will refuse to perform or to continue performance unless he is
promised or paid greater compensation than provided in the original
agreement…[T]he question arises whether the new [agreement to pay
more money] is enforceable.
…
As a matter of principle, the second agreement must be held invalid,
for the performance by the recalcitrant contractor is no legal detriment
to him whether actually given or merely promised, since, at the time
the second agreement as entered into, he was already bound to do the
[performance]; nor is the performance or promise to perform under the
second agreement a legal benefit to the promisor, since he was already
entitled to have the [performance].3
The preexisting duty rule has long been recognized in Nevada.4 However, it has
been applied primarily to commercial real estate transactions.5 So Zhang offers an issue
of new impression as to Nevada law.
Effect of Zhang on Current Law
By extending the preexisting duty rule to residential real estate transactions, the
Court offers a small measure of protection for homebuyers in the volatile Nevada real
estate market. By holding a seller to his agreed upon and accepted offer, the Court
ensures that a seller cannot squeeze a buyer for every possible dollar on threat of losing
the right to purchase a new home. Nevertheless, under the federal Truth in Lending Act, a
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See County of Clark v. Bonanza No. 1, 96 Nev. 643, 650-51, 615 P.2d 939, 944 (1980).
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seller still has the option of terminating the sale within three days of the agreement.6
However, for this to be a possibility after Zhang the seller must open the home back up to
all possible purchasers or the seller could find him/herself in the same position as Mr.
Sorichetti in this case.
Conclusion
By invalidating the second contract for the sale of the property, the court allows
Zhang to have a much stronger case against Sorichetti. Sorichetti’s primary reason for
invalidating the first contract was to obtain a higher purchase price as opposed to his
rescinding of the second contract because he wished to retain the property for his “own
use and disposition.” While the reasoning is essentially the same for each rescission, the
remedy is not. The first rescission qualifies in the court’s own words, as an “actionable
anticipatory breach of contract”7 since the second contract originated from Sorichetti’s
desire for more money, rather than his desire to end dealings with Zhang. The second
contract could be a much closer decision on this issue based on the language that
Sorichetti used in his reasoning for the rescission. However, the court avoids this possible
entanglement by finding that there was never a valid rescission of the first sales contract.
This case shows a great example of the preexisting duty rule and its application in
Nevada’s volatile home market. This decision protects homebuyers from being squeezed
for every possible dollar in a market where the appreciation of a home can be tracked by
the hour, day and month.
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